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Queries
Karen McCullagh
Dear Author
Please address all the numbered queries on this page which are clearly identiﬁed on
the proof for your convenience.
Thank you for your cooperation
Q1 Please supply afﬁliation address.
Q2 Words such as “current” and “recently” are problematic as they depend on date
written/being read. Please qualify by adding date or substitute actual dates/
speciﬁc periods as necessary or use “at time of writing date”, for example.
Q3 Please provide last accessed dates for web addresses.
Q4 Is this note OK?
Q5 Note OK as changed?
Q6 Please provide more detail for this note and last accesed date.
Protecting ‘privacy’ through control of ‘personal’ data collection: a
ﬂawed approach
Karen McCullagh Q1
The development of a frontier-free internal market and of the so-called ‘information
society’ have resulted in an increase in the ﬂow of personal data between EU
member states. To remove potential obstacles to such transfers, data protection
legislation was introduced. One of the underpinning principles of Directive 95/46/
EC is the protection of privacy. Yet, the legislation does not provide a conclusive
understanding of the terms ‘privacy’ or ‘private’ data. Rather, privacy protection is to
be achieved through the regulation of the conditions under which personal data may
be processed. An assessment of whether, 10 years after the enactment of the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998), a coherent understanding of the concept of personal
data exists, necessitated an analysis of the decisions in Durant v. FSA ([2003] EWCA
Civ 1746) and CSA v. SIC ([2008] 1 WLR 1550, [2008] UKHL 47). Furthermore, in
order to examine the effectiveness of the current Q2legislative model, this article
examines whether the term ‘personal’ is synonymous with the term ‘private’ data and
whether control over processing of personal information protects privacy. By drawing
on interviews with privacy and data protection experts, and from the ﬁndings of a
survey of bloggers, it will be shown that a review of the assumptions and concepts
underpinning the current Q2legislation is necessary.
Keywords: data protection; personal; private
Introduction
As IT usage and processing capabilities evolve, regulators, privacy practitioners and citi-
zens are increasingly questioning the suitability and adequacy of the current Q2data protection
legislation to allow the effective processing of personal data while simultaneously safe-
guarding the privacy of individuals. Indeed, the Ofﬁce of the UK’s Information Commis-
sioner (ICO) recently Q2commissioned research into how the EU Directive should be
updated, because
We want to generate new thinking. European data protection law is increasingly seen as out of
date, bureaucratic and excessively prescriptive. It is showing its age and is failing to meet new
challenges to privacy, such as the transfer of personal details across international borders and
the huge growth in personal information online.1
This article begins by exploring the relationship between privacy and data protection at EU
and UK level. It will be demonstrated that the concepts of ‘privacy’ and ‘private’ data
remain nebulous as they are not deﬁned in the Directive. Instead, the Directive provides
a deﬁnition of ‘personal’ data and stipulates the conditions under which such data may
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be processed. Thus, this research explores the meaning of the term ‘personal’ data by
reviewing the cases of Durant v. FSA2 and CSA v. SIC.3 Also, the article assesses
whether control over personal information protects privacy by drawing on interviews
with privacy and data protection experts from a range of countries and disciplines. Further-
more, the views of potential data subjects are explored through a survey of bloggers, which
reports their conceptions of the terms ‘private’ data. The article concludes that a review of
the current Q2legislation is necessary, and that, in particular, the assumptions and concepts
underpinning the term ‘personal’ and ‘private’ need to be revised.
Privacy in Directive 95/46/EC
The goal of privacy protection is expressly stated in the opening provisions EU Directive
95/46/EC, wherein Art. 1 states that the objective is:
to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to
privacy, with regard to the processing of personal data. (Emphasis added)
However, the term privacy is not deﬁned in the Directive. Rather, the Directive seeks to
achieve privacy protection through regulation of the processing of personal data. This is
understandable because no adequate deﬁnition of privacy has ever been produced.4
Personal data deﬁned
The Directive prohibits, subject to exhaustively listed exceptions, the collection and proces-
sing of personal data. In the DPD, personal data is deﬁned in Art. 2 (a) as:
Any information relating to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable natural person; an identiﬁable person is
one who can be identiﬁed directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identiﬁcation
number or to one or more factors speciﬁc to his physical, psychological, mental, economic, cul-
tural or social identity.
Whereas, personal data is deﬁned in the Data Protection Act 1998, as:
Data which relate to a living individual who can be identiﬁed:
(a) from those data, or
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to
come into the possession of the data controller, and includes any expression of
opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data con-
troller or any other person in respect of the individual.
Korff5 noted that the DPA 1998 makes a formal distinction between ‘data’ and ‘information’
but that in practice, it produced no material differences. The deﬁnitions in the Act and Direc-
tive are consistent in their use of the phrase ‘relate to’ but, under the Directive, consideration
is ﬁrst directed to whether the information relates to an identiﬁable individual and then
whether it is processed. Whereas, the deﬁnition of personal data in the Act approaches
the concept in the reverse order, as the Act focuses on the issue from a processing view
ﬁrst and then moves on to whether or not there is an identiﬁable individual. The Directive
and Act also differ with respect to when an individual should be considered as ‘identiﬁable’.
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The term is wider under the DPA as it includes information that ‘may’ come into the posses-
sion of the controller. Korff argues that the phrase may mean that the deﬁnition of personal
data in the Directive can be read as being ‘relative’, because potentially ‘any data that can
conceivably be linked to an individual (in whatever way, by whoever) [can] be regarded as
personal’.6 Booth et al.7 observed that the way that the phrase ‘relate to’ is interpreted has
major implications regarding what is or is not classed as personal data. If it is interpreted
very narrowly, the term personal data could be restricted to data which is capable of identi-
fying an individual, either by itself or in combination with other data. Identiﬁcation, in this
context, could be direct or indirect. In contradistinction, if the term ‘relating to’ is interpreted
broadly it could conceivably include any data which may ‘affect’ the individual in some
way, regardless of its capacity to identify. The consequences of a narrow interpretation of
‘relating to’ will be explored in an analysis of the Durant decision.
UK interpretation of ‘personal’ data
In the case of Durant v. FSA,8 Mr Durant had lodged a complaint with the Financial Ser-
vices Authority following a legal dispute with Barclays bank. The FSA dismissed his com-
plaint. He then made a subject access request for information held manually and
electronically by the FSA on his complaint. The FSA released the information held in com-
puterised form, but refused to disclose the information held on manual ﬁles. Mr Durant
applied to the Court under s 7(9) of the DPA 1998 for an order requiring the FSA to
comply with the subject access request. The Court of Appeal was asked to decide: was
the information held by the FSA relating to the investigation of Mr Durant’s complaint ‘per-
sonal’ data under the Data Protection Act 1998? The deﬁnitional issue which arose con-
cerned whether the data could be said to ‘relate to’ Mr Durant.9
Mr Auld LJ referred to Directive 95/46/EC and ruled that the statutory right of access
under the DPA is designed to enable the data subject to:
check whether the data controller’s processing of it unlawfully infringes his privacy and, if so,
to take such steps as the Act provides . . . to protect it.10
From this the Court concluded that the relevant information is:
information that affects [the data subject’s] privacy, whether in his personal or family life,
business or professional capacity.11
This interpretation of personal data means that not all identifying information will fall
within the scope of ‘personal’ data. Rather, only information that is capable of adversely
affecting the privacy of the data subject will be considered personal. In order to determine
whether or not data ‘relates to’ the data subject, Auld LJ proposed two tests.The ﬁrst test is:
whether the information is biographical in a signiﬁcant sense, that is, going beyond the record-
ing of the putative data subject’s involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal con-
notations, a life event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to be compromised.12
(Emphasis added)
The second test is whether:
the information has the putative data subject as its focus rather than some other person with
whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event in which he may have
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ﬁgured or have had an interest, for example, . . . an investigation into the some other person’s or
body’s conduct that he may have instigated.13 (Emphasis added)
Buxton LJ agreed, stating that the potential effect of processing of particular data on an
individual’s privacy was the guiding principle. The Court also drew support for a narrow
interpretation of the term personal data from the wording of the DPA 1998. Auld LJ asserted
that the DPA’s deﬁnition of personal data extends to expressions of opinion about an
individual which would be otiose if the words ‘relate to’ were construed broadly. Thus,
the Court of Appeal ruled that the information about Mr Durant’s complaints to the FSA
or about their investigation of his complaint were not ‘personal data’ as the data did not
relate to Mr Durant in the requisite sense. Rather, the Court decided that the information
sought by Mr Durant was information about his complaints, as opposed to data relating
to him. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the mere fact that a document is retrievable by
reference to the name of the data subject does not render the information personal data:
Whether it does so in any particular instance depends on where it falls in a continuum of rel-
evance or proximity to the data subject.14
Thus, simply because an individual’s name appears on a document, the information con-
tained in that document will not necessarily be personal data about the named individual.
Rather, it is more likely that an individual’s name will be ‘personal data’ where the name
appears together with other information about the named individual such as address, tele-
phone number15 or information regarding his hobbies.16
This conception of the term personal data is very narrow. If this decision were to be fol-
lowed, only information that is capable of adversely affecting the privacy of the data subject
would be considered personal data. Subsequently the Art. 29 Working Group issued an
opinion on the concept of personal data,17 which contains a broader notion of personal
data. Thereafter, the Ofﬁce of the UK Information Commissioner issued a technical gui-
dance note18 to the effect that Durant is relevant to the question of whether data ‘relates’
to a living individual only in difﬁcult cases where the information in question is not
‘obviously about’ someone. However, the ICO guidance note is not legally binding, as
the Durant decision has not been overruled.
In the case of CSAv. SIC,19 a researcher submitted a request under the Freedom of Infor-
mation (Scotland) Act 2002 (or ‘FOISA’)20 to the Common Services Agency (the ‘CSA’),21
for details of the recorded incidence of childhood leukaemia for certain years in a geo-
graphical area, broken down by census ward. The researcher wanted to explore a suspected
risk to public health arising from the Ministry of Defence’s operations, a decommissioned
nuclear reactor and an operational nuclear processing facility. The CSA refused to disclose
the information on the grounds that it was personal data, the disclosure of which would
breach the data protection principles. On application to the Scottish Information Commis-
sioner (the ‘SIC’), the SIC ordered the CSA to disclose the information sought in an anon-
ymised form using a technique called ‘barnardisation’ which perturbs the dataset in order to
substantially reduce the risk that individual data subject could be identiﬁed from it. The case
raised the importance of whether or not the barnardised information was ‘personal data’
within the meaning of the DPA 1998.
The Lords ruled that the barnardised data was information about the health of the chil-
dren involved. It therefore obviously related to the children and there was therefore no need
to turn to the Durant decision and its concepts of ‘focus’ and ‘signiﬁcant biographical data’,
to decide whether the deﬁnition of ‘personal data’ was satisﬁed.
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The second issue which arose was whether any of the children could be identiﬁed from
the barnardised information (either alone or taken together with other information in the
possession, or likely to come into the possession, of the CSA). The Court unanimously
ruled the fact that the CSA continued to hold ‘other information’ which would ultimately
have allowed it to ‘decode’ the barnardised information to identify each of the children
to whom it related, did not necessarily mean that the barnardised information was still per-
sonal data. However, several different rationales can be identiﬁed from the judgment.
Lord Hope took the view that data can be ‘fully anonymised’ in the hands of the data
controller and thereby cease to be personal data, even where the data controller does have
information which would theoretically allow it to unlock the identities of the subjects of that
data, but did not explain exactly how, or, in what circumstances that anonymisation might
be achieved. Lord Rodger thought that data would remain personal data in the hands of the
data controller provided that the data controller could identify the subjects of that data using
‘reasonable means’. However, the practical implications of that reasoning are not clear. In
marked contrast, Baroness Hale focused instead on the proposed recipient of the data, and
whether he or should could identify the subject(s) of that data from that data alone (given
that he or she would not have access to any of the ‘other information’ in the hands of the
disclosing data controller). This lack of unanimity appears to have arisen from the difﬁculty
which their Lordships faced in reconciling the deﬁnition of ‘personal data’ in the DPAwith
the spirit of Directive 95/46/EC and in particular with Recital 26 of the Directive which
states that ‘the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in
such a way that the data subject is no longer identiﬁable’. Indeed, Baroness Hale stated
that ‘[while their Lordships would] all like the legal position to be that, if the risk of identi-
ﬁcation [of the children] can indeed be eliminated, the Agency is obliged to provide [the
information requested]’,22 in line with the ‘expectation in Recital 26’, she had ‘much
more difﬁculty in spelling out [that conclusion] from the deﬁnition of “personal data” in
section 1(1) of the Act’.23 The foregoing analysis indicates that the attempt to protect
privacy through regulation of processing of personal data is fraught with difﬁculties, due
to the confusion surrounding the concept. The decision does not clarify how the ‘identiﬁa-
bility’ requirement should be interpreted and applied in future cases. Also, questions remain
as to precisely what factors are to be taken into account in determining when data can be
said to be ‘fully anonymised’ and as such, no longer personal data.
Relationship between ‘personal’ and ‘private’ data
Moreover, the absence of a concept of ‘private’ data in the Directive and DPA 1998 and the
fact that privacy protection is to be achieved through the regulation of the conditions under
which personal data may be processed, prima facie suggests that the terms ‘personal’ and
‘private’ are synonymous, or alternatively, that protection of personal data effectively pro-
tects privacy. Yet, there is a lack of research data the effectiveness of the model of privacy
protection advocated in the Directive. This article seeks to remedy that deﬁciency by report-
ing the ﬁndings of interviews with privacy and data protection experts, and also the
responses from a survey of bloggers.
Research method
To answer the questions posed, data was collected in two phases. First, semi-structured
interviews24 were conducted with forty privacy and data protection experts, namely:
privacy commissioners, lawyers, corporate privacy ofﬁcers, consultants, computer
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scientists and academics from sociology, politics, market research, statistics and law.25 The
second phase of the data collection process consisted of an online survey of bloggers from
around the world.26 Out of the total number (1314) of responses received, 1258 were
selected for data analysis; the remainder of responses were incomplete and were disre-
garded. However, the resulting population of participants does not qualify as a random
sample and, accordingly the results from this survey cannot be generalised to the entire
blogging population.27 Rather, the ﬁndings are representative of certain niches of the
English-speaking blogging world.
Research ﬁndings
(1) Views of data protection and privacy experts
All respondents were familiar with the concept of personal data as they had knowledge of
the EU Directive 95/46/EC or it had been implemented into their national legislation, but
indicated difﬁculties in drawing the lines between ‘personal’ and ‘not personal’ data. Some
discussed the fact that technological developments are causing difﬁculties, e.g. advances in
genetics are leading to greater pressure to collect health data and, while this is often stored
and processed in the form of ‘coded’ data, there is a lack of clarity whether such data should
be considered personal data. Another example cited was transaction data/behavioural data
on the internet, e.g. clickstream data can lead to a proﬁle being created which may, or may
not, be considered personal data. When asked whether the concepts of personal and private
data are synonymous, a range of responses were recorded. They have been classiﬁed under
four broad headings:
(i) Private concept not legally recognised. Informally it is synonymous with personal
data
I think in a legal sense – in a data protection sense, yes (the terms private and personal are
synonymous). However, privacy protection and data protection are different, but in a colloquial
sense they are synonymous. (Belgium)
In our law the word ‘private’ isn’t even used, so it doesn’t have a legal meaning. The general
population take them to mean the same thing. (Canada)
The experts drew a distinction between personal data that is protected in law and private
data that is not legally recognised, but which in the mind of the general public, is a synon-
ymous term. When asked to elaborate on the concept of private data, they stated:
(ii) Private data is a subset of personal data that the individual wants to keep absolutely
secret
Private data is the part of the personal data that the respondent does not want to make public.
(Spain)
(iii) Private data is a subset of personal data that the individual wants to control access
to or reveal in limited circumstances
It is something not revealed to others, or only revealed to a select group. It is a concept close to
conﬁdentiality but without the legal connotations, e.g. disclosure to a family member/bank/
personnel ofﬁce e.g. my salary would be considered private. (New Zealand)
Personal data is data relating to an individual . . . . Private data is something you want to keep to
yourself or something that people need to seek your permission to give out. (Australia)
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These responses imply that individuals will face choices regarding disclosure of infor-
mation and that the individual providing the data should decide the nature and extent of dis-
closure. These responses reﬂect the informational control conception of privacy espoused
by Westin, who deﬁned privacy as the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.28
Similarly, in the German census case29 the notion of ‘informational self-determination’ was
advocated. The German Constitutional Court ruled that
This basic right warrants in this respect the capacity of the individual to determine in principle
the disclosure and use of his/her personal data. Limitations to this informational self-determi-
nation are allowed only in case of overriding public interest.30
However, while the experts identiﬁed private data as a subset of personal data that merits
extra legal safeguards in order to protect privacy, they did not offer clearly delineated
boundaries for this term, which could be of general application. Instead, the comments
below illustrate that, in their experience, claims that information is ‘private’ arise on an
ex post facto as opposed to ab initio basis.
(iv) All personal data can be private, depending on contextual factors
They are not synonymous. Private, is an ex post facto term, used mainly to label those
claims for non-disclosure that we’ve accepted on other contextual grounds. Whereas, the
term personal, concerns information about which less contested claims are made, e.g. the
personal fact that I’m bald and short-sighted is personal data but it is hardly a private fact.
(UK)
Personal data can become private. . . . Some pieces of data we don’t want to go elsewhere are
what we consider private – but it depends on the company, e.g. happy for A to know but not B
to know. (UK)
If data is generally personal, it may become private depending upon place, time and circum-
stances . . . in different circumstances people see the same data differently, therefore, it is
very difﬁcult to deﬁne this kind of data. For example, if we approach our bank manager for
a loan then we will be willing to discuss our salary but, in other circumstances you won’t
tell someone your salary. (Finland)
The responses from the data protection and privacy experts embody the philosophical ideals
of autonomy and dignity through ‘informational self-determination’. The experts recognise
that a data subject should have the right to a degree of control over information that ident-
iﬁes them or relates to them, since control over disclosure identifying information is necess-
ary for the development of autonomous individuals. They further acknowledged that it is
not possible to predict in advance what personal information will be claimed as private
by a data subject, since such claims are usually made on an ex post facto basis, depending
on contextual factors.
(2) Views of bloggers
In the survey, almost one-quarter (24.8%) of respondents said that they had posted personal
information on their blog ‘all the time’.31 However, bloggers seem to reﬂect regularly on the
content of posts when deciding whether or not to post personal information online. Most
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respondents (65.6%) said they had considered some information ‘too personal’ or ‘private’
to write about on their blogs.32 Respondents who stated that ‘private’ data did not mean the
same as information which is ‘too personal’ (36.5%) to write about in their bogs were asked
to explain what private information meant.
The largest percentage (30.7%) equated private with ‘controlled disclosure’. It is infor-
mation which the individual wants to control access to, or disclose in limited circumstances.
Below are some illustrative comments:
Some information that I might want to discuss with only a select few . . . . Then I would make
that entry a secure one, so that only those people belonging to that group could read and
comment. It is not information that I consider public, but neither is it too personal to share.
Private’ information varies – there’s stuff you’d share with friends, then only close friends, or
nobody at all.
These responses mirror the responses of the experts and reﬂect the informational control
conception of privacy, as they indicate that bloggers are aware that they constantly face
choices about the nature and extent of information disclosures they make on their blog
posts.
Private data was equated with either legally recognised or potential new categories
of ‘sensitive data’ by just over one-quarter (27.6%) of respondents, as illustrated by
comments
Private information is data about me as an individual such as biometrics, ﬁnancial, political
beliefs etc. Things which are too personal are to do with relationships with other people, etc.
Private information, to me, describes data (ﬁnancial information, phone number, etc.), whereas
‘too personal’ describes emotional information (how I felt about something my friend said last
week).
These responses encapsulate the deﬁnition of privacy offered by Innes who stated that it is
‘the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which includes decisions
about intimate access, intimate information and intimate actions’.33 According to this view
of privacy, not every disclosure of information about a person will amount to a loss of
privacy; there will only be a loss when ‘sensitive’ or ‘intimate’ personal information is dis-
closed.34 The responses indicate that bloggers are aware of such distinctions and actively
limit disclosure of such information on their blogs.
Figure 1. Graph illustrating meaning of ‘private’ data (source: Blog Survey 2006, n ¼ 101).
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It is information which the individual wants to keep ‘absolutely secret’ was the meaning
attributed to ‘private’ information by one ﬁfth (20.8%) of respondents, as illustrated by
comments:
Private is information that I don’t want to discuss with anyone.
Information I would not trust other people with. It doesn’t have to be ‘personal’ in the sense of
intimate. It could be ﬁnancial details, for instance.
A minority of bloggers (13.9%) equated ‘private’ data with the ‘risk of harm’ arising from
data uses:
Private information, when it comes to an on-line environment, refers to any data which a third
party having knowledge of could cause me actual harm, whether ﬁnancial, or by restrictions of
civil liberties. This therefore refers to my ﬁnancial details, address and contact details (though
to a lesser degree).
Private information is information I don’t want total strangers to have (e.g. home address), or
that could be used to cause me a harm (monetary or otherwise, e.g. credit card and PIN
numbers).
‘Information about others’ was the meaning attributed to private data by the lowest number
of respondents (6.9%):
This is information like the names of people I am writing about if they are not in the public
arena or making them identiﬁable in some other way if I haven’t asked.
I don’t write things that are too personal about my friends and family. I don’t paraphrase them
or post IM [Instant Messenger] conversations without running it by them ﬁrst. I don’t use other
people’s ﬁrst names unless they have their own blog that they have given me permission to link
to where they use their own ﬁrst names.
These responses also indicate that bloggers are aware that the notion of privacy hinges on the
concepts of control and consent regarding disclosure. Thus, each individual should decide
for themselves the nature and extent of information which is disclosed. Also, there may
be circumstances in which an individual does not have direct control over their personal
information, but their privacy is nonetheless respected, e.g. a blogger does not post infor-
mation about friends without express or implied consent. Indeed, the responses indicate
that bloggers are aware that some information is shared in the context of a variety of relation-
ships and that maintaining conﬁdentiality and secrecy in respect of such information is a
necessary requisite for healthy functioning relationships. These responses fall within the
‘intimacy’ conception of privacy espoused by Fried who, deﬁned privacy as the ‘control
over knowledge about oneself’.35 He based his deﬁnition of private information on intimate
relationships by asserting that privacy should be valued because it is necessary to protect
‘fundamental relations’ of ‘respect, love, friendship and trust’.36
Criticisms of current Q2approach
The complexity surrounding the concepts of privacy, private and personal data is evidenced
by the responses from experts and bloggers. The responses reveal that there are no consist-
ently agreed meanings attached to any of the terms, and indeed, these terms are often used
interchangeably and in an overlapping fashion. One reason for this is that the data
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protection principles are stated in broad, general terms, rather than in speciﬁc terms capable
of precise legal delineation. However, Art. 22 of Directive 95/46/EC requires EU member
states to provide a right to a judicial remedy for a breach of any of the rights guaranteed by
the Directive. This means that UK Courts must necessarily confer some precise meaning on
the general principles. The Durant decision illustrates the difﬁculties posed by this require-
ment. In that case the Court attempted to apply a purposive approach – asserting that
because the purpose of the access right is to protect the privacy of the data subject, it is
only information that is relevant to that purpose which can be subject to the access right.
However, this approach is artiﬁcial and unhelpful, as it misconceives the role of personal
data in determining the scope of privacy within data protection legislation. It also fails to
recognise that data protection legislation serves other interests, e.g. data accuracy and
data quality.
An alternative ‘harm’ based approach to privacy protection
The responses from the data protection and privacy experts embody the philosophical ideals
of autonomy and dignity through ‘informational self-determination’. The experts recognise
that a data subject should have the right to a degree of control over information that ident-
iﬁes them or relates to them, since control over disclosure identifying information is necess-
ary for the development of autonomous individuals. However, although control may in fact
protect privacy in many circumstances, equating control with privacy is not always effec-
tive. For instance, individuals may be provided with control and subsequently decide to
give up their privacy. Alternatively, once information is shared with another, e.g. in the
course of a friendship or business transaction, an individual no longer has exclusive
control over the disclosure of the information. Yet, the individual’s privacy may (as a
matter of good customer relations, or in the interests of sustaining a friendship), or may
not, be protected in the absence of direct control over the information. Moreover, the
responses by bloggers and experts acknowledge that it is not possible to predict in
advance what personal information will be claimed as private by a data subject, since
such claims are usually made on an ex post facto basis, depending on contextual factors.
Accordingly, some of the experts were critical of the underlying approach of the Directive,
claiming that the current Q2model of privacy protection which is based on collection limitation
principles is outdated. They assert that it regulates at the wrong level and fails to balance
competing interests properly. The Directive regulates the collection and processing of
data, as opposed to regulating speciﬁc harmful uses of the data:
There is a realisation that information is gathered, collected. It [data collection] is ubiquitous
and [it is] impossible to chase wrongful collection; therefore, the focus has shifted towards a
harm-based approach. (USA)
Accordingly, they contend the focus of regulatory activity should shift. It should centre on
harm related to the misuse of personal information.
Regulation of collection is a losing battle – instead ensure it is not used malevolently – infor-
mation will always need to be collected, so you need to focus work on how it is used.
(Australia)
Both bloggers and privacy experts recognised that personal data can be used or misused.
The interchangeable and overlapping uses of the terms personal and private data by blog-
gers indicate that the focus of data protection legislation has erroneously been on the
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categorisation of data into personal or sensitive data, and the limitation of collection of such
data, instead of the harm arising from data uses.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis indicates that the decision in Durant v. FSA is at odds with the
general principles of data protection. It attempts to limit the scope of personal data.
While this approach is prima facie useful from privacy perspective, it fails to recognise
that data protection legislation also serves other interests and that a broader interpretation
of personal data is necessary to achieve these purposes. This failure undoubtedly reﬂects
the notorious difﬁculties that have plagued attempts to give privacy a precise, analytically
serviceable and universally accepted meaning. The failure to deﬁne ‘private’ data in data
protection laws has a cost, in so far as it detracts from the capacity of those laws to offer
prescriptive guidance. A further cost is that it perpetuates the vulnerability of the privacy
concept to the criticisms that it is incapable of deﬁnition, has no independent, coherent
meaning and should be subsumed by other concepts.
It is suggested that the time is ripe to review the provisions of the Directive as the focus
of the current Q2legislative model is erroneously on the categorisation of data into personal
and sensitive data, and the application of different levels of privacy protection to the differ-
ent categories of data. The responses of the experts and blogggers indicate that, in the infor-
mation society, the notion of privacy has changed. In this era, privacy is the absence of
harmful use and application of information about an individual. As the UK Information
Commissioner stated, the Directive ‘out of date, bureaucratic and excessively prescriptive.
It is showing its age and is failing to meet new challenges to privacy, such as . . . the huge
growth in personal information online.’ This paper echoes the Commissioner’s call for a
review of the legislation. In particular the interpretation of the concept of personal data
should be reviewed. It is suggested that it should receive a ‘broad’ interpretation and the
question of when information is ‘identiﬁable’ should be answered using a risk of re-identi-
ﬁcation approach. Also, the concepts of consent and control should be revisited. Further
research is needed on the concept of consent. It may be worthwhile developing a test for
implied consent in order to achieve a balance between privacy interests and the legitimate
interests of others. Also, future legislation could focus on regulation of speciﬁc harmful
uses of personal data and the availability of appropriate remedies.
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